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Abstract: In his article "The India, Empire and its Colonial Practices in South Asia" Yubraj Aryal claims
that Bharatiya discourse supports colonization in South Asia. This discourse justifies oppression of
institutions, practices, of the non-Bharatiya colonized. The article examines Indian Empire's
colonialism toward the weaker, smaller nations along its border and the Bharatiya ideology at the
heart of the repressive empire, which is taken to represent the South Asian subcontinent. The article
looks at the way in which Bharatiya is perhaps a more oppressive ideology than Orientalism and gives
a glimpse into how society, culture, history, and textuality work around power relations to form a
specific form of oppression.
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YUBRAJ ARYAL
The Indian Empire and its Colonial Practices in South Asia
When India gained liberation from the rule of the British Empire in 1947, it was hoped that the new
nation would provide the region with economic stability, border security, and a model of democratic
politics to countries under the grip of tyrannical domestic regimes. However, the opposite result
emerged when India imitated and perpetuated the practices of its colonial master. India has
attempted to create structures to exploit the resources of neighboring countries, inciting internal
conflicts and destabilizing those countries, feeding authoritarian regimes for its own benefit, and
taking advantage of the weak or absent democratic institutions in newly independent countries. The
oppressed, when liberated, has aspired to become a new oppressor. This goal grew from an
expansionist desire, a colonial desire inherited from India's prehistory—the time of Bharatbarsha.
The revival of India's old colonial desire under the new incarnation of the British Raj can be
witnessed in Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of the newly independent republic who visited
Nepal in 1959. When he saw gorgeous, snow-capped Himalayan peaks smiling like the rows of his own
white teeth, he felt a mystic union with the Himalayas and recalled his ancestor's claim that the
Himalayas are the northern border of Bharatbarsha. Just four years later, during an intense border
dispute with China in 1963, Nehru wrote a letter to Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai claiming the
Himalayas as India's northern border, citing Hindu scriptures as evidence: "This northern frontier of
India is for much of its length the crest of the Himalayan ranges. The Himalayas have always
dominated Indian life, just as they have dominated the Indian landscape. One of the earliest Sanskrit
texts, though its date is uncertain—the Visnu Purna—makes it clear that the Himalayas formed the
frontier of India. It states that the country south of the Himalayas and north of the ocean is called
Bharat, and all born in it are called Bharatiyas or Indians" (Eck, India 66). For much of the length of
India, the crest of the Himalayan range is its northern frontier. The Himalayas have always dominated
Indian life, just as they have dominated the Indian landscape. The Visnu Purna, one of the earliest
Sanskrit texts whose date is uncertain, makes it clear that the Himalayas formed the frontier of India.
The scripture states that the country south of the Himalayas and north of the ocean is called Bharat,
and that all born in it are called Bharatiyas, or Indians.
As expressed in Nehru's letter, this Indian myth and dream of the Himalayas as its northern border
bears the imprint of colonialism in the subcontinent. Nehru's claim is exclusively the product of the
Hindu extremist mindset. He omits the many autonomous states and communities which escaped the
Hindu state formation project of Bharatbarsha. One of such state was Nepal. The Hindu epic
Mahabharata mentions the non-Hindu Kirati King Yalamber (one of the Nepali creation myths identifies
him as a king of Nepal), killed by Lord Krishna who feared that Yalamber might help the Kauravas gain
victory in the Kurukshetra war. Twenty-nine Kirata kings ruled for approximately 1,225 years (800
BCE–300 CE). Nepal's most popular creation myth says that, not so long ago, the Kathmandu Valley
was a large lake. Manju Sri, a Tibetan traveler, drained the water from the south and made the valley
habitable. He became the first king of the Kathmandu Valley. Over time, people from the Indus Valley
civilization (Bharatbarsha) to the south and from Tibet migrated into Nepali territory. Migration from
the south surged after the Mughal invasion of Bharatbarsha, and the Hindu Bharatiya escaped the
Muslim invasion by migrating to the Nepali hills. Nehru also blatantly ignored the existence of the
kingdom of Nepal in the lap of the Himalayas as a sovereign, autonomous state alongside the mighty
Bharatbarsha in the South.
Close examination of Nehru's scriptural references supporting the imperial foundation of
Bharatbarsha reveals that these claims are merely an exclusionary Hindu colonial ideology handed
down through Indian history. According to Hindu mythology, Bharata was the founder and emperor of
Bharatbarsha (modern-day India) and the ancestor of the Pandavas and Kauravas, as described in the
Sanskrit epic Mahabharata. According the Adi Parva of the Mahabharata, Bharat's parents, King
Dushyanta of Hastinapura, and Queen Sakuntala entrusted him with uniting the various tribe-based
kingdoms and ruling the South Asian subcontinent as Mahabharat (Greater India). The Adi Parva of
the Mahabharata states that King Dushyanta gave the following command to his son: "The country
south of the Himalayas and north of the ocean is called Bharat, and all born in it are called Bharatiyas"
(my translation) ("अभूतिर् एषा कस ् त्यज्याज ् जीवञ ् जीवन्िम ् आत्मजम ् शाकुन्िळं महात्मानं द ौःषनन्िं भर प रव भितव्योऽयं
त्वया यस्माद् अस्माकं वचनाद् अपप िस्माद् भवत्व ् अयं नाम्ना भरिो नाम िे सि
ु ौः उत्तरं यत्समद्र
ु स्य हहमाद्रे श्चैव दक्षिणम ् । वषं िद्
भारिं नाम भारिी यत्र संितिौः ।।" [Mahabharat 74 sec. [113-14]). The King then retreated to the jungle for
ascetic practices. Bharata conquered the lands south to the Indian Ocean and north to the Himalayas,
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including parts of present-day Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, Turkmenistan, northwest Tibet, Nepal, and Bangladesh. The conquered territories were named
Bharatavarsha after him. King Bharat was given the titles of Chakravarti (emperor), Sarvabhauma
(sovereign), and Sarvadamana (the subduer of all).
However, several kingdoms in the South Asian subcontinent could manage to maintain their
independence and existed alongside the mighty Bharat empire. These tribes escaped the state
formation projects of emperors and sultans from the time of the Indus Valley civilization to the Vedic
period and the medieval age through Portuguese, French, Mughal, and British colonization of the
South Asian subcontinent. The term South Asian subcontinent signifies that this geographical region
has had autonomous areas and peoples. Some were cowherds (Gopal), some buffalo herders
(Mahispal), and some fishermen. They were never ruled by King Bharat nor belonged to Bharatbarsa.
How these tribes managed to remain autonomous and what arts they deployed to avoid being
governed and to preserve their autonomy could be a topic for researchers.
In northern Bharatbarsa, many such autonomous kingdoms along the Himalayas were united by
King Prithibi Narayan Shah in his state formation project, leading to the birth of modern Nepal in
1768. This country is one of the most ancient civilizations in Asia. There, the Lord Buddha and the
goddess Sita, wife of the god Ram, were born, and Siva, the supreme god, founded the source of the
Hindu civilization (in several Hindu myths, Lord Shiva roams the northern Himalayas which are called
Kailash). Nepal's autonomy is mentioned in the creation myth of this Himalayan kingdom. Its history
tells us that different dynasties ruled the land over time, evading Mughal emperors and sultans in
medieval Bharatbarsha and colonial Britain in modern times. This history of independence is a legacy
that every Nepali feels committed to preserving.
When Nehru saw the Himalayas during his Nepal visit in 1959, he recalled his ancestor's unfulfilled
desire to extend Bharatbarsha to the Himalayas in the north. Nehru felt like he was in his ancestor's
homeland. He perceived himself as an emperor robbed of lands his ancestor had conquered and ruled
or, if history is incorrect, at least dreamt of doing so. He did not see Nepal between the southern
Himalayas and northern India.
Nehru and his home minister Sardar Ballav Bhai Patel then conceived the expansionist ambition to
annex Nepal. Nehru tried to become the new emperor, subduer, and sovereign of those smiling
Himalayas in the north. However, the situation was quite unfavorable for a recently independent
nation to colonize another newly founded nation. That would tarnish India's pro-democracy, antiimperialist, anti-colonial image. Occupying a country which had never been colonized and had formally
recognized India's own independence in 1923 would destroy India's aspirations as a newly
independent, democratic country. Like Emperor Bharat, Nehru merely revived the vision of the
Bharatbarsha, a single nation south from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean.
The Indian Empire, though, never accepted the autonomy of Nepal, except in treaties and
speeches. It regards Nepal as a part of Bharatbarsha. This colonial desire has emerged not only from
historical forces but also from India's modern need for vast natural resources, including waters from
the Himalayas vital for the irrigation of the Bihar state. The Indian Empire also wants to expand its
market in Nepal and prevent its market from being reduced or outperformed by the Chinese goods.
India wants to import precious herbs and teas from the Himalayas and export potatoes and tomatoes
to Nepal. These goals resemble British exploitation of India.
Other countries in South Asia, including Nepal, are not only partners in India's commerce and the
sources of its civilizations and languages; they are also its cultural references and the recurring image
of its other. South Asian countries have helped define India as savior, big brother, adult brother, and
benevolent neighbor. Brotherhood—Hindu brotherhood with Nepal, Tamil brotherhood with Sri Lanka—
is a powerful ideological tool of the Indian Empire, which sees other South Asian countries as
constantly dependent on its care. India's doctrine of brotherhood is reflected in institutions, speeches,
scholarship, imagery, doctrine, and colonial bureaucracies and styles.
In the imperial ideology of brotherhood, the big brother assumes the role of protector, authority,
and responsible guardian of younger siblings. In the name of caring for them, the big brother
generally imposes his will on his younger ones. This ideology undermines the principle that, no matter
the size of nations, their sovereignty, integrity, and independence should be respected. Indian foreign
minister Susma Swaraj sought to transform the country's image as the big brother of Nepal and stated
that India instead wanted to be Nepal's adult brother. This terminology merely replaced one word with
another and did not change India's interest and ambitions in domination. It is bizarre to observe how
the Indian Empire deploys its ideology of brotherhood—the politics of the sameness. This is something
different than European colonialism because European colonialism treated people in their colonies as
other. Such a politics of the sameness coverts everything: the empire shields its younger brothers
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from the external world and makes them solely dependent on it in diplomacy, economics, and
governance. India so far has acted as a big brother trying to prevent Bhutan from opening diplomatic
relations with China and other countries. King Mahendra Bir Birkram Shaha of Nepal faced a harsh
economic blockade as punishment for his bold refusal to obey big brother's advice and open diplomatic
relations with China in 1962. The Indian Empire intensified ethnic conflict between the Tamil and
Sinhalese, armed the Tamil, and overthrew Rajapakha's government to force Sri Lanka to accept the
empire's demands. The sermon of brotherhood is often intensified just to cover up such colonial
atrocities.
The atrocities of the Indian Empire do not end there. A popular belief in Nepal holds that the 2001
royal massacre, in which popular King Birendra Bikram Shaha was killed, was organized by the empire
after the king became an obstacle to realizing its interests in Nepal. Assassination of those who
disobey is another tool of Indian colonialism. Can the subaltern speak before the empire? Anyone who
questions the bullying of the Empire is assassinated or otherwise subdued, which makes the
questioning itself irrelevant. Based on these examples, we can make some sense of how the
horrendous and aggressive colonialism of the Indian Empire has been hidden behind the ideology of
brotherhood.
The Indian empire, in fact, views its so-called younger siblings not as brothers but as its dependent
others. This cultural perception permeates academia, politics, and culture. Even as the ideology of
brotherhood is the main justification of colonization, the empire employs the colonial strategy of
exclusion. Key cultural concepts, such as Bharatiya (Indian) and non-Bharatiya, are helpful to
understand this strategy. Bharatiya refers not only to ideas and attitudes but also to gestures,
presence, and the body. Bharatiya has been reconstructed in the arts, biology, anthropology,
linguistics, race, religion, and history. What we can see that the term Bharatiya indicates a group of
ideas that legitimate Bharatiya superiority, various kinds of racism, colonialism, bullying brotherhood,
and unchanging reality. In this context, to be Bharatiya is not a fact but a political construction with
interests in the non-Bharatiya. It is the product of the power exercised over the historically oppressed
non-Bharatiya since the time of Mahabharat or Bharatbarsha. The empire has constructed systematic
disciplines and corporate intuitions to deal with the non-Bharatiya politically, culturally, ideologically,
scientifically and imaginatively. No one can write about Bharatiya nationalism, culture, and identity
without considering how it others non-Bharatiya at the same time. This does not mean that the nonBharatiya concept solely determines the empire's relations with its neighbors.
Non-Bharatiya is not merely a field hidden by the culture, scholarship, and institutions of the Indian
Empire; rather, it is a description of the basic political distinction between Bharatiya and nonBharatiya and a whole series of realities created through the technologies of domination sustaining the
opposite of Bharatiya as its other. Non-Bharatiya is distributed throughout aesthetics, cultures, and
institutions. It is, therefore, a discourse made invisible through which the colonial power of the Indian
Empire operates. It functions in myriad ways: a colonial establishment in New Delhi, the intellectual
power of subaltern and postcolonial studies, and the cultural power of Hinduism. Non-Bharatiya is not
a fact; it is a modern political construction more related to the Indian Empire's colonial ideology than
the actualities of people living within and beyond the Indian Empire. There might be an attempt to
keep the Indian nation's postcolonial knowledge pure, but it is tainted with the obliteration wrought by
the postcolonial nation's double standards, hypocrisy, and mimicry of hybrid colonial strategies
employed by its former colonial master. To talk about one's oppression is certainly acceptable, but to
obliterate and treat another as nonexistent is nothing other than hypocrisy.
Bharatiya did not simply exist but was made by the Indian Empire; it is not part of human nature
but a political construction. It extends to a certain geography and invades certain autonomous tribes.
It treats any people who refuse to be controlled by the empire as anti-Bharatiya. Non-Bharatiya is the
other to Bharatiya. It is what Bharatiya is not, and the annexation of non-Bharatiya's lands, nations,
and identities into Mahabharat (Greater India) is an historical desire the Empire.
During the extraordinary ascendency of the Indian Empire since the departure of the East India
Company, scientists, scholars, businesspeople, and soldiers have sought to dominate or simply
dismiss the non-Bharatiya as insignificant. Concurrently, the rise of the West (the United States, in
particular) resulted in some population migrating there. These migrants also see non-Bharatiya as
either non-existent or not worthy of reading and writing about. What was alluring to them, especially
humanities scholars, was writing and reading about western colonialism, which helped them to secure
attractive positions in the West. These intellectuals' writings emphasize British colonialism to the
exclusion of the Indian Empire's colonialism. Their writings bring to light the exploitation, death,
suffering, and tyranny inflicted by the British Empire and portray India as a nation growing
economically and politically as it emerges from colonialism. This perspective renders invisible the
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condition of the positivity of the Indian Empire: its colonial re-incarnation of its former British master.
When one order died and was buried, a new one was born.
The writings of postcolonial scholars of Indian origin have contributed to making Bharatiya culture
hegemonic over non-Bharatiya. This does not mean that one should not write to enhance one's
culture, but these scholars have ignored the responsibility to critique how Indian cultural superiority
sustains its hegemony over other cultures in the region. These intellectuals are not, after all, universal
humanist scholars, given that they have approached their professional work from specific concerns,
belief sets, and social positions. Whether their literary productions are fraught with political
signification might be a large question. However, I contend that their literary, theoretical, and artistic
productions which ignore the colonialism and exploitation by this postcolonial nation cannot be
considered nonpolitical. Those who produce postcolonial texts of the Indian nation are not innocent
producers of pure knowledge.
The conditions of these texts' production are based on the segregation of their (past or present)
nation-state's colonialism, its adaptation of the British Raj, and its desire to be the new Raj,
preeminent in at least the subcontinent, if not the globe. They do not even acknowledge strangers;
they even do not regard the people of those nations as their other. Recognizing someone as a
stranger or the other grants the status of identity. The postcolonial scholars of the Indian descent
refuse to give them even that status; they simply treat strangers as nonexistent, unlike European
colonialism, which largely operates by othering the other. For Indian postcolonialists, the others of the
Indian Empire are the Chinese, Americans, and, to some extent, the Pakistani (because they possess
nuclear arms).
The Indian imperial machine simply does not recognize the existence of others. It is all about itself.
For it, the South Asian region means the Indian region. It is ancient Bharat Barsha or Mahabharat
(Greater India). The same view can be found in academia. I do not have precise numbers, but I have
not heard of any Nepali hired as faculty members in South Asian studies programs at American
universities. I do not think that there are many Bhutanese or Maldives either and only a few
Bangladesh and Pakistani. This means that these programs at U.S. universities have been taken over
by Indian nations. Not only the faculty but also the courses, texts, and teaching methodologies are
dominated by those who represent the institution of the Indian Empire, even outside its bounders, far
away in the U.S. This is a more dangerous situation than the Orientalism perceived by Edward Said.
Orientalism at least recognizes the identity of the Orient as a snake charmer or lazy, dirty
collectives. The exotic other as seers, snake charmers, wizards, and witches touches upon the
precious substance of one's humanity. I might feel differently if I were part of the colonial societies of
Europe. However, as a representative of a society colonized by the postcolonial nation of India, I think
it might not be too negative to have at least some form of recognition. In Orientalism, existence and
identity are established as the other. In the concept of non-Bharatiya, human beings in colonized
societies do figure even as the other. Only these people know how painful is to live as a nonexistent
being in another's perspective, compared to being recognized as a stranger or the other's inferior. We
who live in the colonized nations of the Indian Empire lose the otherness of the other not because the
Indian Empire treats us as the same but because the sameness of the other is used as a technology of
colonialism.
This is different from the Levinasian view of the other as an infinite sameness of "I." If the Indian
Empire thinks of us as the same, it wants us to undergo Bharatiyazition and merge our territory into
its own. This is a negative sameness, a colonized incorporation rather than the benevolent kindness of
the Christ to which Levinas's concept of the other refers (Levinas, Totality and Infinity 121). The
Orient can at least feel its existence in its denial. The people of the Fourth World—the colonized
nations of the postcolonial nations—suffer identitylessness in two ways. On one hand, the Indian
Empire obliterates the historical facts that define the nation-states and people on its border. For
example, the Lord Buddha and Mount Everest are the foundation of Nepali identity, but not a single
text in the West states that Buddha was born in Nepal and that Mount Everest is in Nepal. Students
are taught that both the Buddha and Mount Everest belong to India. The Indian empire, through its
publishing media, has created and disseminated that knowledge globally. This empire has constructed
the artificial Lumbini, the birthplace of Buddha, in Uttar Pradesh and the impression that Mount
Everest is a Himalayan peak in northern India. The nation of Nepal and its people have been so
systematically buried in the shadow of the empire that many think that Nepal that is part of India.
To be blind to all these realities, whether consciously or unconsciously, is to be part of the
Bharatiya machine. One's knowledge is not automatically innocent or holy. To not speak about any
form of oppression is to be part of the machinery of oppression. The oppressive regime has fixed what
you want to see in the Bharatiya and how you want to see it. The marginalized, repressed, and
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colonized non-Bharatiya possess enormous creativity, but they are repressed and need our help. They
want to transcend their circumstances, but Bharatiya renders them insignificant. The big brother
cannot tolerate the small brother's self-development and exercise of freedom.
Going to the atomistic level of the empire and disconnecting oneself from the overarching thread
without building a concurrent individuality might be considered distortion and inaccuracy, but it
reveals the depth of the empire. The empire politicizes every field of knowledge at the micro level. Its
intelligence bureau RAW is entrusted with the reproduction, proliferation, and infiltration of
populations; the analysis and complete control of economic systems; intelligent scrutiny of political
systems and political leaders' movements and activities; control of literary, journalistic, and cultural
activities; and implementation of divide-and-rule and stick-and-carrot policies among leaders and
bureaucrats.
Such deployment and control recalls the Gramscian observation that political society takes over the
realms of civil society as the academy and brings the academy into existence to serve its purposes
(Gramsci, The Prison 194). The transition from the gurukul academy (schools of saints and monks) to
the modern, capitalist university-based academy in the Indian empire has realized that specific
purpose. The objective research by those politically funded institutions serves the political function of
the empire to classify and possess accurate, exact knowledge and ways to silence or maintain
deliberate ignorance of knowledge. One of the greatest Indian poets Rabindranath Tagore grasped and
resisted this reality from the inside as a member of a powerful class, writing, "Where knowledge is
free …/ Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let my country awake" (Tagore "Where"162). Tagore
well knew how the political machinery produces and disseminates knowledge through civil society,
which over time absorbs it as the only true, innocent, and pure form of knowledge.
The empire's political machinery retains the expertise to invade civil society with the political. It
knows how to incite civil society and charge it with the political will of the empire as if it were its own,
as if the empire's desires were the best course for it. For example, a certain section of the Sikkim
people was made to accept incorporation into India—rather than the weak rule of their king—at the
cost of their identity, nationality, and culture. All academic knowledge and even ignorance (or nonknowledge) of other South Asian countries are violated by gross political fact. Said states that "no
production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author's involvement as
a human subject" (11).
These political actualities are bizarre and yet unwritten and unheard of. These realities might
matter less to those who are not their victims. Bharatiya's deliberate sidelining of non-Bharatiyan
realities—constructed by its aggressive political, economic, and military interventions to render the
non—Bharatiya nonexistent—is a deliberate political act, not innocent ignorance. For postcolonial
writers of Indian descent, there is no denying that they have ignored the discussion of non-Bharatiya,
Bharatiya hegemony, and their postcolonial nation's colonial aggression in the region.
A revolutionary intellectual politics does not erase or ignore one form of oppression in favor of
another and does not avoid its responsibility to read and write against colonial aggression by any
nation in textual and historical scholarship. Postcolonial studies in general and South Asian studies in
particular (this is also true in African and East Asian studies) cannot seriously study the hegemony and
colonialism of postcolonial nations towards their peripheries. "If the postcolonial has always been
concerned with interrogating the interrelated histories of violence, domination, inequality, and
injustice," then the ignorance of postcolonial nation is blatant (Young 20):
Whether there is no longer domination by nondemocratic forces (often exercised on others by Western
democracies, as in the past), or economic and resource exploitation enforced by military power, or a refusal
to acknowledge the sovereignty of non-Western countries, and whether peoples or cultures still suffer from
the long-lingering aftereffects of imperial, colonial, and neocolonial rule, albeit in contemporary forms such
as economic globalization. Analysis of such phenomena requires shifting conceptualizations, but it does not
necessarily require the regular production of new theoretical…: the issue is rather to locate the hidden
rhizomes of colonialism's historical reach, of what remains invisible, unseen, silent, or unspoken. In a sense,
postcolonialism has always been about the ongoing life of residues, living remains, lingering legacies. (Young
20-21)

For these colonized societies, the postcolonial is something about which they heard and read. It is
always the future yet to come. The "post" is yet to come. Colonialism remains: it lives on, ceaselessly
transformed into new configurations in the present. The postcolonial mindset has taken hold in almost
all disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, from classics to contemporary area studies, from
legal studies to theology, from cultural studies to sociology. Arjun Appadurai has emphasized the need
to shift studies of the postcolonial world from a narrow national focus to the context of present-day
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globalization. However, he has assumed that all societies are already postcolonial, as if there were no
non-western societies on earth living alongside postcolonial or postindependence nations (Modernity
2). The coercion of national sovereignty and the violation of the territorial integrity of weaker nations
in the Global South have not come to globalized attention. So many theorists have established the
postcolonial in the humanities and social sciences; so many subdisciplines and areas of studies, such
as diaspora and transnational studies, have reached into nearly every domain of contemporary
thought. However, the conditions under which the colonialism of post-independence countries toward
their peripheries are ignored by high-profile theorists as if such colonialism, hegemony, and
oppression do not exist. Postcolonialism to these victims is not about radical politics; it is the
bourgeoisie capitalist and elitist academic enterprise of a few former postcolonial nations whose
performativity renders one form of colonialism visible and other forms invisible. Postcolonialism is
fascist in its ends; it is incomplete and narrowly focused on postindependence societies. It hides in its
soul racism, hatred, xenophobia, and stereotypes of those living on the peripheries of nations.
Postcolonialism attempts to incorporate into itself every issue that arises in the contemporary world,
such as indigenous struggles and their relation to settler colonialism, illegal migration, and political
Islam, but never raises the questions I do here.
Introduced by Gramsci and revised by its proponents, postcolonial studies' reconceptualization of
the subaltern speaks to the invisibility of indigenous people and their voices and interests (see
Chakravorty, "Can the Subaltern Speak" 47). Gramsci's concept has enabled subaltern historians and
cultural critics to recover a whole arena of historical agency that remained invisible when history was
written according to exclusive protocols of nationalist movements and class conflicts. However, this
history has been written within the national boundaries of the Indian Empire. If it ever crossed these
boundaries, it crossed into an analysis of immigrants from the South Asian subcontinent to the west.
It has never turned its attention to how the neo-oppressors which were formerly oppressed have
exploited people of other nationalities—the non-Bharatiya—within the Indian Empire or beyond its
borders. For postcolonial scholars, the Indian subaltern matters, but what about the Nepali subaltern,
the Bhutanese refuge subaltern, the Sri Lanka subaltern, or the Bangladeshi subaltern? What role
does the colonial aggression of the Indian Empire play in their subalternity? How can they speak
against their powerful oppressor?
The politics of invisibility involve not actual invisibility but the refusal by those in power to see who
or what is there. The task of the postcolonial is to make visible what the colonial power has made
invisible. The indigenous voices and the anticolonial struggles of North and South America have
recently been included, and in this sense, the invisible has been rendered visible. The anticolonial
struggles against the dominant nation-states within these regions, however, have been deliberately
ignored, whether in the South Asian subcontinent, African continent, or the South China Sea region.
Rather than demanding inclusion of this subject matter within postcolonial studies, I propose a
separate area of study for the colonialism of postcolonial nations. Given the scope of this area, studies
on postcolonial nations' colonialism could be as broad as postcolonial studies. Colonialism and its
exploitation and repercussions in all spheres of life are as broad as those of European colonialism and
its exploitation of postcolonial countries. Superficial incorporation is not enough. The Third World has
been taken over by powerful postcolonial nations. Its oppressed peripheries are shadowed by its most
dominant nations. The peripheries of the postcolonial nations constitute the Fourth World.
Colonialism and the oppression we suffer today in the Fourth World are not a part of our past, a
haunting memory; they are our living present, the recurring reality of everydayness. The postcolonial
viewpoint and method are redundant and unhelpful for the study of contemporary colonized nations'
struggles for freedom. Thinking societies colonialized by the postcolonial nations and their anti-colonial
struggles through a postcolonial frame is impossible. Postcolonial nations' colonialism is more
atrocious than settler colonialism—the colonization of marginal or indigenous groups by others. Settler
colonialism occurs within a nation-state, so the settler bears some responsibilities and obligations.
Postcolonial nations are free from such national considerations. Border encroachments and attacks on
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Fourth World have become everyday phenomena. The
West is too far away to hear about it, and if some western nations did, they might think that they are
potential defenders of democracy and freedom. It is not a race or a civilization but the nationalities of
these people which have become the primary targets of postcolonial nations' colonialism.
The political questions raised by Bharatiya concern what political, intellectual, artistic, economic,
military, and cultural investments have been made to construct the non-Bharatiya. How have
anthropology, philology, lexicography, biology, history, literary writing, art production, and the
political and economic sciences been made to serve Bharatiyabad? What transformations, changes,
and breaks have taken place within Bharatiyabad? How has Bharatiya transmitted and reproduced
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itself? How can we perceive how bhai-bhaiko sambandha, rosiroti, and betiko sambandha are defined
by Bharatbarsa and its neighbors? This does not mean that all knowledge produced by Bharatbarsha,
including yoga, meditation, and the Kama Sutra, is intensely political. I only claim that knowledge and
power are connected in specific case studies and forms of epistemology.
Some methodological problems seem challenging. What should be the point of departure from
postcolonial studies? What texts, art objects, ideas, authors, periods, and areas can be put together to
study postcolonial nations' colonialism? The primary challenge is that there does not exist a practice of
creating poetry and novel-writing about postcolonial nations' colonialism. Literary writers and creative
artists have not explored this field for several reasons. Why do people write less about their own
repression? In this case of a lack of texts, I suppose that people might think that the empire is too
great to be challenged. Another possible reason is that there is not a developed practice of writing
about transnational or between-country experiences of each other—although some great films tackle
familial, cultural, and political relations, especially between the people of India and Pakistan. The
anticolonial struggles and effects of colonialism have been documented largely only in journalistic
writing. Pakistani non-Bharatiya are different than Nepali non-Bharatiya; Bangladeshi non-Bharatiya
are different than Sri Lankan non-Bharatiya. Within Sri Lankan non-Bharatiya, Hindu Sinhalese are
closer to Bharatiya than the Buddhist Tamil. In the case of Nepali non-Bharatiya, Madheshi Nepalis are
closer to the empire than the Pahadi Nepali Non-Bharatiya.
I do not attempt to detail the entire history of narratives of Bharatiya but select some which show
the connections between knowledge and politics. The historical narratives themselves do not speak to
what I am trying to say, so I attempt to make a sizable amount of texts speak. How the Bharatiya see
the Chinese, Arabs, Islam, Middle Easterners, and Africans is not covered in my study. Those peoples
are the Far non-Bharatiya rather than the Near non-Bharatiya living on the Indian Empire's immediate
geographical border who are poor and politically unstable and are my concern. The Near nonBharatiya cannot be discussed without discussing the Indian Empire's involvement, just as we cannot
discuss the Middle East without discussing American engagements.
Bharatiya have become an intellectual and cultural authority over non-Bharatiya. This authority
must be acknowledged in South Asian, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka studies. The
Bharatiya's intellectual position in postcolonial South Asian studies must be interrogated and
challenged. Like any authority, there is nothing mysterious or natural about Bharatiya authority. It is
constructed and disseminated by power relations. At its heart are yet unexplored but deep racism,
segregation, oppression, and arrogance. This authority is highly instrumental, cunning,
transformative, and hypocritical.
Why have the non-Bharatiya been provincialized? Why have South Asian departments in western
universities provincialized the studies of small countries in the region? We need an emancipatory
moment, along with encouragement, to write and read about such provincialization. As the peasant
insurgencies in India were understood differently by Europe, colonized societies' struggles have been
provincialized as insufficient to warrant attention or as mere expressions of jealousy and malice
against India's economic growth. Postcolonial theorists of Indian origin thus provincialize the
sufferings of weaker nations on their peripheries. Unless these nations build the capacity to represent
themselves beyond Indian imperial perspectives within the region and beyond, they can never escape
the provincialization of their colonial situations by the Indian Empire and its proxies. How do we form
such a collective, and how can this initiative go beyond a matter of experimentation? I, at least, can
say that this is a necessary step for our liberation.
Dipesh Chakrabarty's project of the enunciation of the "political modernity" of South Asia by
provincializing modern European political ideas seems redundant to the Fourth World (4). He is
blatantly ignorant that India alone does not represent South Asia (except to arrogant patriots), and
political modernity cannot begin in South Asia without the destruction of Indian authoritarianism or
hegemony. Provincializing Indian colonialism is more urgent than provincializing modern European
political ideas. The European enlightenment is not wholly negative, even though its ideas have
furnished a superstructure for the imaginary of European colonialists. If one can conceive of the Indian
enlightenment as progress, one should critique Indian authoritarianism, even if in doing so, one might
find a conflict between one's nationality and the truth. From Homi Bhabha to Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak, from Dipesh Chakrabarty to Ania Loomba, from Gaura Desai to Leela Gandhi, Indian's
colonialism toward its neighbors and its practices, customs, and ideas have been insignificant matters
about which to write and read. What faith, then, can we have in the texts of these brownish white
people whose loyalty to their own nation blinds them to the historical reality of the colonialism that
India imposes on its borders? Those who are victims see provincializing the Indian Empire as more
important than provincializing Europe for their political modernity. However, the Fourth World's
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provincialization of the Indian Empire should be entirely different than Dipesh Chakrabarty's
provincialization. Our provincialization does not start by condemning the other's modernity as an evil.
Therefore, I am not sure the word provincializing is a useful category in this context.
Postcoloniality enabled Indian domination of South Asia as postindependent or postcolonial nations
slipped away from the Eurocentric postcolonialism discourse and engaged in colonial oppression. The
postcolonial mode of thought and the formation of political modernity in South Asia should go hand in
hand with resistance to Indian colonialism in the region, South Africa's colonial oppression on the
African continent, and China's domination in the South China Sea region. Homi Bhabha misses such a
project when he defines postcoloniality:
Postcoloniality, for its part, is a salutary reminder of the persistent neo-colonial relations within the 'new'
world order and the multi-national division of labour. Such a perspective enables the authentication of
histories of exploitation and the evolution of strategies of resistance. Beyond this, however, postcolonial
critique bears witness to those countries and communities—in the North and the South, urban and ruralconstituted, if I may coin a phrase, 'otherwise than modernity'. Such cultures of a postcolonial contramodernity may be contingent to modernity, disconnuous or in connection with it, resistant to its oppressive,
assimilationist technologies; but they also deploy the cultural hybridity of their borderline conditions to
'translate', and therefore, reinscribe, the social imaginary of both metropolis and modernity. (6)

Bhabha cites performance artist Guillermo Gomez-Pena's song as an example. Nowhere in the
entire book, though, Bhabha understands that moving beyond the intervening moment of the hereand-now within postcolonial nation states involves a critique of postcolonial nations' colonialism in
smaller nations. Bhabha relates the here-and-now with the metropolises of the Western world, the
hybrid creative performance of Green and Gomez-Pena. The sagas of the Nepali, Kashmiri, and
Bhutanese who are the victims of the Indian Empire never rise to Bhabha's consciousness.
Leela Gandhi's defense of democracy as a shared art of living and her postcolonial appeal for an
ethics of becoming common are never directed toward the defense of the democracy of the victims in
the societies colonized by the Indian Empire. The ethos of Gandhi's ethics is exceptional, but what
value does it have for those whose democracy has been taken away by the empire? Such ethics does
not fight for them. It does not open a new path for their future.
Following Chakrabarty, Bhabha, and Gandhi, what other sorts of intellectual, aesthetic, scholarly,
and intellectual investments were made in the formation of colonial tradition? How did other
enterprises—science, medicine, philology, lexicography, history, biology, political and economic
theory, novel-writing and poetry—serve colonialist objectives, silencing resistant voices and the
imposition of hegemony? What changes, modulations, revisions, and revolution have taken place
within the colonial shadow? What have been the meanings of friendship, cooperation, and roti (bread)
and beti (woman) relations? How has colonialism reproduced itself through these ideologies from one
epoch to another? Indian colonialism cannot be understood simply as a historical complexity but as
the willed colonial work of the empire. The humanistic inquiry that I am doing inevitably relates to
politics and culture, but I am not homogenizing colonial rule from one epoch to another. Rather, I am
saying that a humanistic investigation of these issues should be directed toward understanding the
connection between colonialism and our world.
In conclusion, the essay tries to claim that work on colonized societies in South Asia relates the
Bharatiya discourse hidden within which justifies oppression to other works, institutions, practices, and
the non-Bharatiya colonized. This interrelation provides a broader view of these complex networks put
in place. We cannot explore South Asia without considering the Indian Empire's colonialism toward the
weaker, smaller nations along its border and the Bharatiya ideology at the heart of the repressive
empire, which is taken to represent the South Asian subcontinent. For readers from literary and
cultural studies, Bharatiya is perhaps a worse ideology than Orientalism and gives a glimpse into how
society, culture, history, and textuality work around power relations to form a specific form of
oppression. For general readers, this essay provides understanding of how the formerly oppressed has
become the master and forgotten its worst sufferings. It gives an understanding of how the rising
economy of the nation which wishes to be considered the second-biggest democracy on earth has a
'ruthless' colonialism in its heart.
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